Transborder Industrialization and Singapore's Suzhou 'Experiment': A Paradox of Context? by Gao, Lu et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
1-2005
Transborder Industrialization and Singapore's
Suzhou 'Experiment': A Paradox of Context?
Lu Gao
WEE TAN
Caroline YEOH
Singapore Management University, carolineyeoh@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the International Business Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Gao, Lu; TAN, WEE; and YEOH, Caroline. Transborder Industrialization and Singapore's Suzhou 'Experiment': A Paradox of
Context?. (2005). International Conference of the Global Business Development Institute, 2005. 82-91. Research Collection Lee Kong
Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2544
                                                                                                        Topic area:  06 Global Business 
                                                                                                         
Submitted to  
Global Business Development Institute 
2005 International Conferences 
Bangkok, Thailand 
January 3-6, 2005 
 
Presentation 
  
TRANSBORDER INDUSTRIALIZATION & SINGAPORE’S  
SUZHOU ‘EXPERIMENT’: A PARADOX OF CONTEXT?1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GAO Lu 
School of Economics and Social Sciences 
(Email: lu.gao.2003@economics.smu.edu.sg) 
 
 
TAN Wee 
Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
(Contact author - Email: wee.tan.2003@business.smu.edu.sg) 
 
 
Caroline YEOH 
Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
 (Email: carolineyeoh@smu.edu.sg) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
Singapore Management University 
469 Bukit Timah Road 
Singapore 259756 
 
Tel: (65) 6822 0377 
Fax: (65) 6822 077 
                                                 
1
 This research is funded by the Wharton-SMU Research Centre, Singapore Management University. 
Abstract 
 
This paper revisits Singapore’s much publicized, and controversial, transborder 
industrialization projects in China, viz, the Suzhou Industrial Park. The strategic initiative, 
premised on Singapore’s positive reputation in infrastructure management and 
corruption-free administration, was proffered as a ‘model’ for future projects in China, and 
the region. Our paper contends that a paradox of context has dogged the Suzhou 
‘experiments’, and the intended ‘cloning’ of the Singapore industrial development model, 
beyond demarcated national boundaries, is a much more complex and challenging 
process.  
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Introduction 
 
“Going regional is, therefore, about investing our expertise and capabilities in other growth areas 
in the region, interlocking them with our domestic economy. It is to strengthen our domestic 
economy, expand our national economic zone, and ratchet up our standard of living. This is the 
mission of our regionalization drive.”  
- Goh Chok Tong (Singapore Forum Proceedings, 1993) 
-  
“In January 1993, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong announced Singapore's regionalization drive. 
We have made good progress. Singapore's trade grew by an average of 6.3% a year, from S$257 
billion in 1993 to an expected S$470 billion last year. Singapore's direct investment overseas grew 
by an average of 22% from 1993 to 2001.”  
- George Yeo (International Enterprise Forum, 2004) 
 
This 1993 landmark speech by Singapore's former Prime Minister Goh enunciated the new focus in 
Singapore’s economic development. Ten years on, as Singapore’s Minister for Trade and Industry, 
George Yeo, noted in his speech, the general effect of the regionalization drive on Singapore’s trade 
figures were indeed positive. However, several of the initiatives under this regionalization drive have had 
unexpected and mixed results – most notably in the development of overseas industrial parks, in co-
operation with foreign governments. The intention of this main initiative was obvious – to create ‘special’ 
investment zones in the region in which Singaporean and Singapore-based manufacturers would enjoy 
privileges concordant with Singapore’s partnership in the development of the investment zones, and, to a 
certain extent, this it succeeded in. However, as will be discussed below, unforeseen circumstances 
exposed these ‘industrial parks’ to a number of unexpected difficulties and dependencies. 
 
The concept of entering into partnerships with foreign companies has long been a central point in 
Singapore economic policy, with the government having offered a number of investment incentives to 
attract foreign multinational companies (MNCs) ever since the mid-1960s. However, by the mid-1980s, a 
combination of rising domestic labor costs and increasing economic development leading to greater 
competition in the region created a necessity for Singapore to shift away from a labor-intensive paradigm 
to one more focused on quality and service; one that produced more ‘value-added’ activities, so as to 
maintain its technological edge and regional hub status. Along with this came a greater need to access 
foreign markets and their latest technologies, which the Singapore government attempted to accomplish in 
1988 with an overseas investment program (Singapore Economic Development Board, 1988, 1990) that 
sought to encourage Singapore-based firms to enter into joint ventures and partnerships with foreign firms, 
especially those in Europe and North America (Caplen and Ng, 1990; Wong and Ng, 1991). The majority, 
however, of these investments achieved little in terms of opening up either markets or technology, and 
instead produced immense accumulated losses even before the early 1990s (Balakrishnan, 1991; Kanai, 
1993). Clearly a reformulation of strategy was required; and the new strategy embraced by the Singapore 
government focused instead on expansion within Asia, interest in the region having been fueled by 
explosive growth in the economies of several countries (notably Indonesia and China) following the 
relaxation of foreign investment controls (Regnier, 1993; Pang 1995; Kraar, 1996; Kwok, 1996; Okposin, 
1999; Pereira, 2001, 2003; Blomqvist, 2002; Sitathan 2002;).  
 
The main thrust of Singapore’s new regionalization strategy involved the establishment of industrial 
township projects – or, as they are now more commonly known, ‘industrial parks’ –  in China, India and 
several Southeast Asian countries, and the offering of a wide range of regulatory and monetary incentives 
to assist Singapore firms and individuals to move into overseas markets. This was to aid in the transition 
of Singapore into a ‘total business centre’ – low-value manufacturing moving out to other countries, while 
the domestic economy restructured itself into one focused on high-value manufacturing and regional co-
operation with both foreign and local MNCs. The ‘industrial township’ model was of especial interest 
because it allowed government-linked companies, or GLCs, to take a direct role in the regionalization 
drive; too, the infrastructure required in the building of such a township offered opportunities for small-
scale operators and service providers, such as clinics and small-scale contractors, to play a role in the 
development of these townships (Tan, 1995). Co-operation with the host governments would also lay the 
groundwork for greater economic collaboration in the future. Singapore’s selling point to these host 
governments was simple – to quote Dr Richard Hu, “Singapore’s skilled workforce, good contract laws, 
and transparent business practices”, or perhaps more accurately, the country’s reputation for the above. 
More than money or expertise, the Singapore brand name was to be the country’s other main contribution. 
 
This, it seemed, proved to be the case when Chinese premier Deng Xiaoping, in a visit to Singapore, 
extended an open invitation to Singapore to look into developing a model industrial township in China, to 
test the efficacy of Singapore business methods in a Chinese environment. Premier Deng aimed to not 
only deepen China’s economic relationship with Singapore, but to also provide a test environment 
through which his countrymen could learn from Singapore’s business and management practices, as well 
as from Singapore’s foundation of good urban planning, social security systems, etc. To Singapore’s 
policy makers, this was only confirmation of the marketability of the Singapore brand name, and the 
project soon had their full support. The final selling point for this project, which would come to be known 
as the Suzhou Industrial Park, was the perception that Singapore and China shared a common cultural 
heritage, and a strong sense of kinship between its citizens; as will be discussed, however, the social and 
political attitudes of the two peoples proved to be rather less common than might have been initially 
thought. 
 
The Suzhou ‘experiment’ has been examined from various perspectives; including politics (Yang 1997), 
economic geography (Yeung, 1998; Perry and Yeoh, 2000), business (Tan and Low, 1996; Wong and 
Goldblum, 2000), international relations (Lee, L.T. 2001) and more recently, from sociology (Pereira, 
2003). This paper seeks to contribute to the current discussions by providing insights at the firm level, 
through the perspectives of investors in SIP.  
 
 
Analytical Framework 
The Suzhou experiment will be examined in the context of Porter’s value chain analysis, which takes a 
firm-central perspective. Porter’s theory suggests that a firm’s success in any given location is dependent 
on a conglomeration of myriad factors relating to the many individual activities of the firm, and including 
such factors as demand conditions and the presence of related and supporting industries. It therefore 
suggests, among other things, that the production process should be viewed as a value chain (Porter, 1986, 
1994, 1996), and that also, firms should select a location with comparative or location-specific advantages 
that will serve to complement the competitive advantage they enjoy as a result of being placed higher up 
in the value chain. It further postulates that, considering the increasing pace of globalization, it is also 
necessary to alter location-specific advantages in accordance with the integration of rapidly changing 
global economic activities and the increasing influence of governments and regional authorities over the 
sphere of business activities in the region. This is necessary to create a synergistic advantage through the 
strategic alignment of the competitive and comparative advantages of any given region. The degree to 
which this alignment may have or have not been accomplished in the Suzhou Industrial Park will be 
considered.  
 
 
Suzhou Industrial Park 
 
The Chinese leaders looked to Singapore as a successful development model that had substantial 
reference values, as China’s state reforms entered a new phase in the late 1970s. The message was later 
more clearly conveyed when Deng remarked during his famous South Tour in 1992 that, “Singapore 
enjoys good social order and is well managed. We should tap on their experience and learn how to 
manage better than them” (SIPAC, 1999). This vision set the tone for the strong political support and 
commitment from both the Chinese and Singaporean leadership; from the Chinese leadership, for the 
opportunity to pick the minds of their Singaporean collaborators, and for the Singaporean leadership, for 
the opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness and transferability to other Asian contexts of the 
Singapore model. The Park was formally launched on May 12, 1994. 
 
However, barely five years into the flagship project, Singapore started to acknowledge that the original 
vision of transferring its development model to Suzhou was a much more complex and challenging 
process than earlier envisaged. By early 1999, the township had attracted a resident population of only 
5,000 against a target of 600,000; the park was employing 14,000 workers, while the original target was 
360,000. The prospects for transplanting the Singapore model were flawed to begin with. 
 
Firstly, the difference in organization of government of the two countries was one of the flaws of the 
project. Singapore, being one of the world’s smallest countries, has one layer of government, which is the 
state government; in contrast, China has five layers of government, and the sheer size of the country and 
the physical distance between Beijing and other provinces effectively render the connection between the 
central government and the local municipal governments more intractable. Although the Joint Steering 
Council was co-chaired by the then Vice Premier Li Lanqing, the management responsibility rests with 
the Suzhou government. This complicity caused problems in communication and misunderstanding, and 
led to Senior Minister Lee’s public questioning of the commitment of the Chinese partner to the project 
(The Straits Times, December 5, 1997; Sydney Morning Herald, March 21, 1998; Far Eastern Economic 
Review, July 8, 1999). 
 
Secondly, the difference in national context and development experiences had led to conflicts between the 
two sides over phase objectives of the project. A good example of this was disagreements over the 
physical structure of the park itself. The Chinese had expected a vibrant park filled with “tall buildings”, 
for that was their perceived way to attract investors; the Chinese partners had also proposed that housing 
development be carried out hand-in-hand with industrial development. The Singapore partners, however, 
insisted on the ‘Jurong Town Corporation’ model, where the development of the industrial sector 
precedes that of other sectors; the same model also calls for more practical and unattractive buildings, a 
far cry from the ‘tall buildings’ expected by their partners. The considerations involved in exporting the 
Singapore model, it seems, precluded a real exploitation of internalization-specific advantages. 
 
Thirdly, the Singapore partners underestimated the difficulties posed by carrying out such a massive 
project in China, for the first time. The perceived ethnic and cultural similarities overlooked the multiple 
competing groups within a common ethnic group; more importantly, the differences in mindset and 
values shaped by the different economic environment and development experience. The Singapore 
partners came across as being arrogant, and as having incomplete understanding of the nuances of doing 
business in China.  
 
These, and other, protracted difficulties led to the announcement in 1999 that Singapore would stop 
pouring in additional investments and, pari passu, would transfer majority ownership of the Park to the 
Chinese partners, with the latter taking a 65% stake in the new alignment of interests (The Straits Times, 
June 30, 1999; South China Morning Post, June 29, 1999 & September 30, 1999). Interestingly, SIP 
performance turned around within a year following the transfer of majority ownership and management 
control. To date, SIP has managed to secure contractual investments worth a total of US$15.6 billion, and 
has established itself as an investment hub for high-tech industries. Over 70% of the investments are in 
electronics, precision engineering and software development. The Park boasts a tenant profile of 
prominent American, Japanese and European firms, including 46 Fortune500 companies (SIPAC, 2004).  
 
In retrospect, the transfer of the Singapore model in both industrial management and accompanying social 
systems has indeed reaped some results (Pan, Zhou & Zhao, 2000), after taking into consideration 
China’s national context. Some of the essence of the Singapore model has found its way into the SIP; 
some of which are business concepts completely new to China, such as “one-stop” service for investors 
and a “pro-business” philosophy in attracting investment. In addition, there have been visible 
achievements in other areas such as social security system reform (through the adoption of a modified 
version of Singapore’s Central Provident Fund system), home ownership, community centers and urban 
planning, among others. The Suzhou ‘experiment’, then, would seem to have enjoyed at least partial 
success; though obviously nothing like what was originally envisioned. 
 
Going forward, the 6th Joint Steering Council meeting has since raised new development goals for the SIP: 
contractual investment to exceed US$20 billion; utilized investment to surpass US$10 billion; and GDP 
to hit RMB50 billion. China Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Co. Ltd (CSSD) plans to be 
listed by 2005 in China, and possibly in Singapore, as well as to build an international standards high-tech 
park. The completion of the second and third phase of the transportation network and other infrastructure 
developments, at an estimated cost of US$10 billion, is in progress. The infrastructure development for 
the rest of the 70 sq km site, the sub-districts outside the core CS-SIP, is due for completion over the next 
two years. Table 1 updates on SIP’s operational statistics. 
 
 
Case Studies 
 
So far much of the analysis on SIP has relied primarily on secondary data from official sources and 
press publications and has focused on a macro level. To gain a deeper insight into business environment 
in SIP, and to evaluate the Park’s progress from the tenants’ perspective, we present case studies of five 
selected firms from CS-SIP, based on interviews with personnel involved in their firms’ operations in 
the Park. All interviews were conducted in May, 2004. Theories, from the perspective of the firm, have 
argued that the production process should be viewed as a “value chain”. As previously mentioned, Porter 
(1986) postulates that the firm is an ensemble of discrete, value activities, namely, primary activities such 
as inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and services, as well as support 
activities. Companies should identify the comparative or location-specific advantages unique to each 
country/territory, and the competitive or firm-specific advantages unique to the firm/core functions, and 
then incorporate these advantages into the value chain (Kogut, 1984, 1985; Porter, 1985, 1986). 
Rationalization theory suggests that firms should reallocate their operations in different locations to 
capitalize on the comparative advantages offered in each location. To ascertain the applicability of the 
above theoretical framework, the interview questions were structured to gather information on the push-
pull factors influencing the decisions of the tenants to locate in the Park, as well as some of the 
advantages and constraints faced by the firms. 
 
Company A: Semiconductors 
 
A major US-based semiconductor manufacturer, Company A has manufacturing facilities in countries 
like the US, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. The company also based one of its 
design centers in Singapore. Officially registered in 2002, the company opened its 800,000 square foot 
factory in SIP on September 29th, 2003. Its current employee strength stands at 750, and has targeted sales 
of US$40-50 million for the first year in operation. 
 
During the interview with the Senior Vice-president for operations, it was learnt that the company plans 
to increase the number of employees to 2,000 in the next one and a half years, and is looking at sales in 
terms of billions in a few years’ time. As part of the initiatives undertaken by the company to meet the 
goal of doubling the sales in 2004, the factory is also the first completely new facility built by the 
company since it became an independent entity in 1997. 
 
The company aims to reduce manufacturing costs by 30%, as well as to balance its dependence on outside 
contractors with its SIP facility, through reducing its outsourced assembly and test production. The 
presence of complement industries in the SIP helps, too, as resources become more accessible and easily 
obtained. This has added on to the company’s competitive advantage. However, with more and more 
companies venturing into SIP, this competitive edge over its competitors can become harder to maintain – 
with firms competing for resources such as labor and raw materials. “Shortages of skilled manpower and 
experienced managers can be a major constrain, materials also become more expensive as we go along… 
we also consider the initial capital cost.” 
 
Company B: Engines and Drive Systems 
A major German-based engine maker, Company B manufactures a wide range of industrial products such 
as diesel engines, gas engines, gas turbines, injection systems, fuel cells and vehicles in factories around 
Asia, with Singapore being its regional headquarter. The company had its grand opening in July 1997 and 
received its first engine major overhaul job in November. For the year 2003, the Suzhou division 
registered a turnover of approximately 30 million yuan. It currently has an employee force of 50, mostly 
local. Today, the SIP branch is engaged in a variety of business activities besides its manufacturing 
operation. It serves as the after-sale service co-ordination centre for the entire China, provides support to 
service dealers and OEMs, provides spare part supply, and serves as a customer training centre. 
According to the interview with the General Manager for Regional Distributor Management, the main 
factor that motivates the company to make this strategic move was the “proximity to the market”. By 
having its operations in China, they are able to be close to its customers and make its presence felt in the 
market. Furthermore, the firm would also prefer to handle its operations itself, instead of letting external 
parties to provide exclusive customer services. 
Despite the success of its SIP factory, the company has also faced certain constraints. Among them, rising 
labor cost and high labor turnover are the two major problems the company and other industrial 
manufactures have been experiencing. “There is abundant supply of highly-skilled workers and 
management staff, thanks to the concentration of tertiary and vocational institutions in the region; 
however, we are a bit concerned about the pressure of the rising labor cost. Besides, many locals are not 
willing to stick to their job for more than 15 months.”  
Company C: Circuit Protection Solutions 
 
Company C is one of the first ten pioneer tenants to set foot in the Suzhou Industrial Park. The US-based 
circuit solution manufacturer entered the SIP when the Park was barely incepted, and since witnessed the 
transformation of farmlands into industrial estates suitable for production and business activities, which 
took two years to complete. Today, the plant is wholly foreign-owned and the staff strength is about 560. 
Besides SIP, the company also has plants in Australia, Japan, Korea and other parts of Southeast Asia, 
with Singapore being the Asia-Pacific headquarters.  
 
The management had long recognized the availability of market and competitive labor costs as major pull 
factors of the company’s venture into Suzhou. The political support behind the project was another 
important contributing factor to the decision of moving into the SIP. “By 1992, we could foresee that 
China will have good business prospects,” commented the General Manager from the Singapore office.  
 
In the company’s view, the transfer of ownership and management from Singapore to China went quite 
smoothly due to the reduced cost during the transfer. In addition, the transfer of management expertise, 
commonly known as software, has also been very successful. The company plans to use the SIP plant as a 
stronghold as well as the regional headquarter, as the company ventures further into China. Following the 
SIP factory, its first manufacturing plant in China, the company has also set up divisions in Shanghai, 
Beijing and Tianjin. 
Company D: Software development 
 
Established in 1998, the SIP division was the Singapore-based software developer’s first operation in 
China. Positioned as an offshore software development centre, the company targets to fulfill the project 
delivery resources needed for its business in Singapore, Australia and Hong Kong. Over the years, the 
original workforce of 8 is now 150-strong, and there are plans to double this figure by the end of 2004. To 
accommodate burgeoning operations, the company moved to larger premises at the International Science 
and Technology Centre in the SIP last year. It is currently the largest IT development centre in the Park. 
 
Impending market development was the most compelling consideration behind the company’s strategic 
decision. “In 1998, the Chinese market was demanding mainly hardware, we established a software 
development centre to obtain readiness for the Chinese market when it started buying software,” 
commented the first General Manager of the company’s SIP division. 
 
The company’s set-up process wasn’t without its challenges. There was only one university in the area 
and it did not focus on engineering; the company had to recruit manpower from other cities like Nanjing 
and Beijing. Currently, its human resource requirements are not always met, however, it has been 
acknowledged that the situation has significantly eased up over the years with the establishment of IT 
training centers within the park and new accommodation. While the company looks to set up offices in 
other parts of China, it will continue to grow its operations in SIP. 
 
Company E: Electronics  
 
Company E is a medium sized Swiss firm that is mainly engaged in manufacturing activities. Its Suzhou 
branch is also a relatively new establishment (June 2002), with a work force of about 200, mostly local, 
save for two or three senior managers. Gaining access to the Mainland China market was the most 
important strategic consideration for the SIP setup. 
 The company was content with the development and upgrade of supporting infrastructures as well as 
residential amenities in the Park for the past two years; it was also specially mentioned that European and 
American firms generally enjoy some measure of advantage in terms of “popularity” among locals, over 
most Asian firms, such as those from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Some of the reasons cited include 
better corporate welfare and human resource policy, as well as more relaxed corporate culture, etc. In fact, 
the company bears the view that SIP itself was more catered for American and European firms, while 
many Asian firms have chose Suzhou New District and Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park.  
 
As for the major constraint faced by the company, it was mentioned that while the Singapore-styled 
Central Provident Fund system has helped attract talent to the Park, it has also become a cause of concern 
as it adds to the rising cost of production. Labor turnover was also cited as one of the problems, though 
the company stressed that there has been a circulation of labor within the Park itself. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Of the five interviewed firms, three expressed satisfaction with SIP’s infrastructure and management, and 
the last expressed qualified satisfaction with the market environment. While the proximity to market was 
the common pull factor indicated by the interviewees, they were quick to point out that the better overall 
investment environment was one of the most important reasons for their companies’ decision for picking 
SIP over the other regions in China. At the initial stage of the Park’s development, Singapore’s reputation 
in industrial management had been a huge draw factor to not only MNCs, but also to Singapore-based 
SMEs, who consider SIP a “safer” choice without the plague of “hidden costs” commonly found 
elsewhere in China.  
 
It seems that SIP has been able to retain this advantage despite talk of rising competition from 
surrounding areas; most of the interviewed firms still cited excellent general infrastructure as an important 
consideration in selecting their location. The transfer of ownership and management control in 2001 was 
not a cause of concern to tenants and new entrants; in contrast, most welcomed the change as costs in the 
Park fell following the transfer. The Chinese management, primarily represented by Suzhou Industrial 
Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC), is now perceived to be sufficiently competent, following the 
first few years of ‘understudying’ from their Singapore counterparts, to run the area as efficiently as the 
aforementioned Singapore counterparts had. In addition, firms’ belief that matters in general will be easier 
to settle now that they go directly to the Chinese, who “own the road”, has added to investors’ confidence. 
 
The major constraint factor faced by the Park is labor. High labor turnover rates and the limited range of 
skills supplied are the most common problems shared by the interviewed firms. These are the local factors 
that are beyond the control of the planning of the Singapore model, and are some of the considerations 
that ought to receive more attention from Singapore planners when attempting to clone a model 
environment in a foreign context. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Singapore's policymakers had great faith in the transborder industrialization strategy, on account of the 
city-state’s connections with both multinational corporations (MNCs), established from the onset of her 
modern economic development, as well as guanxi with Asian business networks. The practical intent, in 
the context of the Suzhou ‘experiment’, was to clone a Singapore-styled, “walled city isolated from the 
rest of the China” (Thomas, 2001). In a paradox of context, the case-study park encountered greater 
development challenges when isolated from, than when integrated, into the broader host environment.  
 
All the same, the measured success of the Park has demonstrated the appeal of the Singapore industrial 
development model. The investments attracted have provided the basis from which the Parks could grow. 
Concomitantly, official commitment to Singapore’s regionalization initiatives in China remains, as is the 
willingness of Singapore’s planners to search for alternative strategies to re-position the regionalization 
efforts (Singapore Ministry of Trade & Industry, 2003). Perhaps, in this re-thinking, the ‘real politik’ of 
transferring ‘Singaporean’ institutional innovations to emerging economies will elicit a more incisive 
scrutiny.  
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Table 1: Operational Statistics 
 
General Information on CS-SIP    (Feb 2004) 
Country Profile of Tenants (by % of size of investment) 
Scale of Development (hectares) 7,000 
Investment by Developer (US$ million) 12,400 
Committed Tenants 573 
Area Taken Up (hectares) 980 
Investment by Tenants (US$ million) 15,200 
Export Value (US$ million) (2003) 5,960 
No. of Employees 137,029 
Country Profile of Tenants (by % of size of investment) 
Japan  13.4 
Singapore  22.7 
North America  19.2 
Europe  14.7 
Other Asian economies (and Oceania) 29.1 
Others 0.9 
Sector Profile of Tenants (by % of size of investment.) 
Electronics/Electrical/IT/Software 58.8 
Precision Engineering/Mechanical 7.5 
Chemical/Pharmaceutical & Healthcare 11.9 
Food & Beverage 5.8 
Light Industry 7.9 
Logistics and Supporting 8.1 
Others - 
Sources: Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Council & SembPark Management Pte Ltd 
